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Abstract 
The article seeks to assert that the ritual of Santhara 
practiced by the followers of Jainism is not a suicide and 
discerns from the view of the Rajasthan High Court. The 
authors have used various sources on Santhara for 
research work and have analysed various case laws on 
right to die with dignity. At the outset, the article 
discusses the eminence of Santhara in Jainism. Further, it 
discusses the foundation of the „essential practice‟ 
doctrine through various landmark judgements. The 
Rajasthan High Court has erred in holding that Santhara is 
not an essential practice in Jainism, when the same has 
been proved by Jain ascetics and religious denominations. 
The High Court ruling also contravenes the Supreme 
Court judgment, which holds that the right to life 
includes the right to a dignified life up to the point of 
death and would also encompass a dignified procedure 
for death. The article attributes the raison-d'être of the 
court, to the western perspective, overlooking the 
religious diversity of the Indian subcontinent and the 
various practices associated with different religions. 
Lastly, the article concludes that the Supreme Court needs  
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to lay emphasis on the difference between essentially 
religious and secular practices and re-affirm the right of 
religious freedom. 




“Death is our friend, the truest of friends. He delivers us from agony. I do 
not want to die of a creeping paralysis of my faculties- a defecated man” 
-Mahatma Gandhi 
The Indian subcontinent is the birthplace of three great religions, 
namely Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism, which is one of the 
oldest religions of the country.  It is a pre-historic religion, dating 
back to 3000 BC, before the development of Indo-Aryan culture. 
Though there are many similarities that exist in the South Asian 
religions, certain parts of the belief systems are unique to each 
religion. According to Jain philosophy, the universe is composed of 
six substances which are indestructible. Two out of these six forms 
are the most important: Jiva (soul) and Ajiva (matter). The soul 
(Jiva) is either bonded or is liberated. It is a system of philosophy in 
which right conduct is a vital condition for spirituality as liberation 
can only be achieved by right conduct. Focus is on equanimity of 
thought and conduct. Fasting, meditation and other austerities are 
a part of the Jaina way of life. Penance occupies a unique place in 
Jainism. Perhaps, in the world religions, none parallels Jaina 
religion in the practice of penance, whose purpose is spiritual 
purification.1  The supreme object of ethical code of Jainism is to 
show the way for liberation of the soul from the bondage of Karma 
by cultivating the three jewels (ratna-traya), namely Right faith, 
Right knowledge and Right conduct, which constitute the path to 
                                                          
1 Kokila H. Shah, The Jain Concept Of Sallekhana:  A Loss or a Gain?, 
NATIONAL SEMINAR ON BIO ETHICS (2007), available at 
http://www.vpmthane.org/Publications (sample)/Bio-Ethics/Kokila% 
20H.%20Shah%201.pdf (last visited Dec. 27, 2015). 
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it.2The highest importance in Jainism is attached to passionlessness. 
It teaches not only the art of a beautiful living but also the art of 
dying a dignified death. In Jainism, Sallekhana popularly known as 
„Santhara‟ is a kind of ritual suicide undertaken as part of the 
process of reverence for all life and has traditionally been seen as a 
spiritual zenith for all Jain monks. The word sallekhana is actually 
„sat+lekhana‟ meaning making his death an immortal act by firmly 
fixing his entire focus on his soul at the time of departure. Santhara 
is a posture adopted by a practitioner of Sallekhana. According to 
Jainism, all lives are sacred, based on which an ideal, of the refusal 
to do anything which would harm life at all. This embodies 
undertaking extreme steps such as the refusal of food and water to 
avoid killing anything, even microbes. Santhara is a slow method, 
whereby an individual slowly decreases his/her intake of food and 
liquids, ultimately leading to death. It is undertaken as a form of 
sacred vow. These vows were singularly named as „Sallekhana‟ in 
the rock inscriptions at Sravana Belagola, a city located near 
Channarayapatna of Hassan district in Indian state of Karnataka, 
where the work called Retna Karvadaka gives the directions 
translated as follows: 
When overtaken by portentous calamity, by famine, 
by old age or by disease for which there is no cure, 
to obtain liberation from the body for the sake of 
merit that Aryas call Sallekhana. He who is perfect 
in knowledge possess the fruit of all penance, which 
is the source of power; therefore should one seek for 
death by the performance of some meritorious vow, 
so far as his means will permit…... 3 
With the meditation of the five salutation mantras (pancanamaskara-
mantra), he should avoid the five transgressions: (1) a feeling that it 
would have been better if death would come a little later; (2) 
wishing for a speedy death; (3) entertaining fear as to how he 
would bear the pangs of death; (4) remembering friends and 
relatives at the time of death; (5) wishing for a particular kind of 
                                                          
2 T.K. TUKOL, SALLEKHANAISNOT SUICIDE 4 (L.D. Institute of Indology, 1976). 
3 Lewis Rice, Jain Inscriptions at Sravana Beloga, THE INDIAN ANTIQUARY: A 
JOURNAL OF ORIENTAL RESEARCH 323-324 (1874). 
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fruit as a result of penance.4  The basic concept underlying the vow 
is that, man who is the master of his own destiny should face death 
in such a way so as to prevent the influx of new Karmas, even at 
the last moment of his life and at the same time liberate the soul 
from the bondage of Karmas that may be clinging to it then.5  
Today there are more than 4 million Jains in India. By an estimate, 
300 Jains die every year across India due to such fasts and their 
deaths are usually celebrated publicly in the community. When a 
Jain feels that he has entered the final stage of life, with no more 
ventures in life to undertake, he may seek the permission of his 
guru, family, relatives and friends to take up the sacred vow of 
Santhara. Once approved, the Jain is permitted to gradually give up 
food and liquids. During this time, he must be ready to give up all 
worldly attachments and make peace with death. 
However, recently this practice has been brought under the 
scrutiny by the Rajasthan High Court that termed it to be a criminal 
offence and equated it with suicide. The judgment delivered by the 
Rajasthan High Court in Nikhil Soni v. Union of India6 held that 
Santhara/Sallekhana were not an „essential religious practice‟ of 
Jainism and there was no mention of such practice in Jain scriptures 
or religious texts. They rejected the claim that such a practice was 
to be protected under Article 25, 26 or 29 of the Constitution of 
India. The Rajasthan High Court appears to have erred in 
determining that Santhara is not an essential practice in Jainism. 
This article would first discuss as to what is meant by the term 
„essential religious practice‟ and how it  has evolved over time and 
the authority of the judges to determine a particular activity of a 
religion as essential or not. 
II. Defining the Essential Religious Practice Doctrine 
The first traces of the „essential practices‟ doctrine dates back to the 
times when the makers of the Constitution were undergoing 
assembly debates while drafting the Constitution of India. It was 
                                                          
4 TUKOL, supra note 2 at 10. 
5 TUKOL, supra note 2 at 7. 
6 Nikhil Soni v. Union of India & Ors WRW 247/2015. 
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Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, who mentioned this phrase in the Constituent 
Assembly Debates stating that: 
The religious conceptions in this country are so vast 
that they cover every aspect of life, from birth to 
death. There is nothing which is not religion and if 
personal law is to be saved, I am sure about it that in 
social matters we will come to a standstill. I do not 
think it is possible to accept a position of that sort. 
There is nothing extraordinary in saying that we 
ought to strive hereafter to limit the definition of 
religion in such a manner that we shall not extend 
beyond beliefs and such rituals as may be connected 
with ceremonials which are essentially religious. It is 
not necessary that the sort of laws, for instance, laws 
relating to tenancy or laws relating to succession 
should be governed by religion.7  
He had anticipated the need to differentiate between „religious 
activities‟ and „secular activities‟ in light of India‟s deeply ingrained 
religious beliefs and therefore had attached the word „essential‟ to 
only religious activities, thereby  leaving only the secular activities 
under the scrutiny of the judiciary. He was of the opinion that 
secular activities undertaken behind the veil of religion shall 
hamper the progress of the society. It is for this sole reason that the 
starting lines of Article 25 and Article 26 of the Indian Constitution 
lay down the restrictions to which an individual‟s right to freely 
practice, profess and propagate and manage the affairs of his 
religion is subjected to. Although not inscribed in any of the 
articles, the word „essential‟ plays an important role in drawing a 
line between what is religious and what is secular. 
In the case of S.R. Bommai v. Union of India,8 Justice P. B. Sawant 
gave a very clear distinction between what was religious and 
secular. He stated that notwithstanding the attitude of the state 
towards any religion, religious sects or denominations, religion 
could not be mixed with any of the secular activities of the state. He 
                                                          
7 Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume VII, available athttp:// 
parliamentofindia.nic.in/1s/debates/vol7p18b.html. 
8 S.R. Bommai, AIR 1994 SC 1918. 
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further stated that an individual‟s freedom of religion only 
extended to his activities done in pursuit of his spiritual life which 
is distinct from secular life. The activities undertaken in pursuit of 
spiritual life shall come under the exclusive domain of  the affairs 
of the state. The word „essential‟ was used to draw the thin line 
between secular and religious.  Indian Courts have time and again 
attempted to determine what practices and activities have been or 
are fundamental to a religion. Such endeavours by the courts took 
the form of a doctrine and thus the name „essential practice 
doctrine‟. 
The „essential religious practice doctrine‟ as prescribed by Dr. B.R. 
Ambedkar was first used by the Supreme Court in the Shirur Mutt9 
case. A petition was filed by the mahant of the Shirur Mutt 
monastery challenging the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable 
Endowments Act, 1951 contending violation of Article 26 of the 
Indian Constitution. The Supreme Court laid down the following 
guidelines: 
(1) The doctrines of the religion itself shall be used to determine 
whether a practice constitutes an essential practice in that religion 
or not. 
(2) Complete autonomy shall be granted to a religious 
denomination or organisation in determining as to what rites and 
ceremonies are essential to their religion. Further, no interference 
shall be allowed by any outside authority to decide on such 
matters. 
(3) The state shall have a right to regulate religious practices when 
such practices are in contradiction to “public order, health and 
morality” or are economic, commercial or political in nature. 
Thus, the Supreme Court‟s interpretation of the doctrine is in line 
with what was propounded by Ambedkar. The judgment is 
significant because it clearly states that the authority of 
determination of an essential practice in a religion vests in the 
religious denominations and organisations. This led to the official 
                                                          
9 Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri 
Lakshmindra Thirttha Swamiar of Shri Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282. 
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inception of the 'essential practices doctrine' in the jurisprudence of 
religion in India. Subsequently, matters under this doctrine were 
given protection under Article 25 and Article 26 of the Indian 
Constitution which provide protection to acts done in pursuance of 
religion, rituals and ceremonies observed. 
The Supreme Court adjudicated upon the constitutionality of 
Bombay Trusts Act, 1950 which was alleged to have violated an 
individual‟s fundamental right under Article 25 and Article 26 of 
the Constitution of India in the case of Ratilal Panachand v. The State 
of Bombay and Ors.10  Justice Mukherjea reiterated the principle as 
was laid down in the Shirur Mutt11 case. It was held that the 
religious acts and practices done in pursuit of religious beliefs were 
as much a component of religion as were faith and belief in the 
particular religious philosophy or doctrines. It was also stated that 
no outside authority had the right to declare any practice of 
religion as essential or non-essential. Further, no unconditional 
right was vested with any of the authorities of the state to discard, 
restrict or limit any religious practice, that they consider beneath 
the pretence of administering a verity estate. 
Further, while comparing the Indian Constitution with the 
American and the Australian Constitutions, Justice Mukherjea 
stated that the Indian Constitution was an improvement over these 
constitutional texts, as Article 25 and Article 26 clearly states as to 
what can be regarded as religion. There were no limitations on the 
right to freedom of religion in the constitutional texts of United 
States of America and Australia. The limitations relating to public 
health, morality and social protection were laid down by the 
Australian and American courts through judicial pronouncements. 
The beauty of Indian Constitution lies in the fact that the 
constitution makers embodied these very restrictions in the 
constitution itself under Article 25 and Article 26, which have 
evolved through judicial pronouncements in other nations. 
These two judgments played an essential role in defining a 
relationship between the state and organised religion. Sufficient 
amount of free play was given to religious denomination in 
                                                          
10 RatilalPanachand, AIR 1954 SC 388. 
11 Shirur Mutt,AIR 1954 SC 282. 
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regulating the matters of their religion. The approach of the 
Supreme Court in these two judgments was to use the „essential 
practices doctrine‟ as a means to determine whether a particular 
practice was religious or secular, rather than determining whether 
the practice was essential to a religion. 
However, the doctrine with its original meaning could not last 
long. In the early 1960‟s, judicial interpretation began to 
circumscribe the scope of religion, and judges took into their hands, 
the task of determining those crucial questions that were quite 
internal to a religion, there by attempting to define the nature of 
religion itself. The seeds of such shift in the interpretation of the 
„essential practices doctrine‟ were sown in the case of Shri 
Venkatrama Devaru v. State of Mysore.12  The case dealt with the 
applicability of the Madras Temple Entry Authorisation Act , 1947 
and the right of Harijans to enter the Sri Venkatrama Temple which 
was founded by the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins, who restricted 
the entry of Harijans into the temple. The Court, deciding the 
matter, went on to refer religious scriptures and case laws in order 
to examine the practice of restricting Harijans from entering the 
temples. It was held in this case that on certain special occasions 
and ceremonies, the temple authorities had the right to exclude 
certain persons. 
The ruling in this case only partially applied the doctrine of 
essential practices. The Court accepted that religion encompassed 
rituals and practices but failed to appreciate the autonomy of a 
religious denomination or organisation to decide which ceremonies 
were essential. The Court‟s approach of referring to scriptures and 
validating the restriction upon Harijans was not only  contradictory 
to the essential practices doctrine but was also not in consonance 
with the objective of the state to eliminate caste based 
discrimination. 
It would not be wrong to mention that the original definition of the 
essential practices doctrine could not survive over a decade. The 
next case in line which gave a new direction to the doctrine was The 
Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali and Or.13  In this case, 
                                                          
12 Shri Venkatrama Devaru, AIR 1958 SC 255. 
13 The Durgah Committee, Ajmer, AIR 1961 SC 1402. 
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The Durgah Khawaja Sahet Act, 1955 was constitutionally 
challenged by the Khadims of shrine in Ajmer contending that the 
alleged Act abridged their right to manage the properties of the 
Durgah and also to receive aids and offerings from the pilgrims. 
Justice Gajendragadkar, by associating a secular history to the 
shrine upheld the validity of the Act. A note of caution was also 
issued which emphasized the role of the courts in determining as to 
what constituted an essential and integral part of religion and also 
distinguishing for the first time between irrational belief and 
religious practices. Thus, now the court had started acting as a 
gatekeeper, keeping a check on what practices qualified as religion. 
A comparison of the cases of Shirur Mutt14 and Ratilal15 shows that 
the word „essential‟ was used to determine whether the practice 
was religious or secular. A paradigm shift in outlook was 
witnessed and the doctrine was now being used to determine the 
importance of a practice within a religion.  
Judgments of relevance to this shifting interpretation are delivered 
by Justice Gajendragadkar, which enhanced the authority of court in 
rationalizing religion, are Sri Govindlalji v. State of Rajasthan16 and 
Yagnapurushdasji v. Muldas.17 The ruling in these cases stated that 
the question of determining a practice as religious or secular and 
further determining the importance of a practice in a religion will 
always have to be decided by the courts. Thus, these series of 
rulings, over the decade, established that the questions relating to 
religious practice would always be subject to interpretation. 
However, these rulings were in contradiction to what was the 
original meaning of the „essential practices doctrine‟ as envisaged 
by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and as held in the Shirur Mutt18 and 
RatilalPanachand19 cases.  
                                                          
14 Shirur Mutt,AIR 1954 SC 282. 
15 RatilalPanachand, AIR 1954 SC 388. 
16 Sri Govindlalji, AIR 1963 SC 1638.  
17 Yagnapurushdasji, AIR 1966 SC 1135. 
18 Shirur Mutt,AIR 1954 SC 282. 
19 RatilalPanachand, AIR 1954 SC 388. 
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We can see that the present form of „essential practices‟ doctrine 
does not hold the original meaning that was intended by the 
Constitutional drafters. The court should only have the authority to 
ask whether a particular religious ritual or practice is “sincerely 
held” by the followers of the religion which can be ascertained by 
the conduct of the adherents and the regularity with which the 
practice has been followed over ages. The authority to question the 
substantive nature of the practice itself should not be vested with 
the courts. 
III. Santhara - Suicide or Dignity in Death 
The Rajasthan High Court in the judgment equated the practice of 
Santhara to an act of voluntary suicide. The arguments raised by the 
Jain practitioners that, Santhara is not a practice to achieve 
unnatural death, rather it is a practice associated with a person‟s 
ethical choice to live with dignity until death, were not considered 
by the court. The reasoning provided by the Court was superficial 
and substantial justifications for its stance were not provided. The 
basic problem that lies, is in the application of a law inspired by the 
west which governs eastern religious notions and practices. The 
Indian Penal Code, 1860 which criminalises voluntary death was 
drafted by Lord Macaulay. The concept of suicide associated with 
religion is a repugnant one for the mainstream Anglo-Saxon West, 
whose Judeo-Christian beliefs would denounce such an act as 
antithetical to the moral and ethical principles espoused by 
Christianity.20  Lord Macaulay, an orthodox Christian drafted the 
code with a western outlook overlooking the varied religious 
diversity of the Indian subcontinent and the various practices 
associated with different religions. The eclectic religious texts born 
out of the Indian subcontinent have extensively deliberated on 
death from multiple viewpoints, and voluntary death in certain 
circumstances has been respected and exemplified through various 
religious heads, including Mahavira. A man has a moral right to 
                                                          
20 Shekhar Hattangadi,Santhara in the eyes of the Law, available at http:// 
www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/Santhara-in-the-eyes-of-the-
law/article 7541803.ece.(last visited Dec., 2015). 
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terminate his life as a part of religious freedom guaranteed under 
the Constitution of India.21  
A better understanding of the Jaina concept of Santhara would 
reveal that it is not a form of suicide, rather, a means for self 
realisation. It is meant to free oneself from the bonds of the body, 
which are no longer useful.22  Santhara is neither the destruction of 
life out of passions; nor is it motivated by desires which 
characterize suicide.23  According to Jain philosophy, an impure 
death by suicide involves increase in passions; a pure death, as in 
Sallekhana, does not. In Jainism, passions are seen as a direct cause 
of the influx of Karma impurities to the soul and thus, they result in 
rebirth at a lower level, while a passionless state of mind leads to 
both the cessation of the accumulation of Karma and the destruction 
of existing karma that is already attached to one‟s soul.24  
Santhara is a multivalent term which cannot be reduced to the 
dreariness of suicide as closure or termination. Santhara performed 
correctly, is a ritual of non-violence.25  Except for physical death, 
there is nothing similar between suicide and Santhara. A person 
usually commits suicide or attempts to do so when he is going 
through certain conflicts in his mind, some feeling of guilt, 
hopelessness and the inability to deal with a problem which can be 
of a very serious nature. Frustration, exhaustion in life, anxiety, 
depression, mental insanity or arousal of any passion through 
abetment may also be the reasons. On the other hand, no such 
factors motivate a person to adopt Santhara. There is no feeling of 
guilt, disgrace or disgust in oneself. It is the individual‟s free choice 
to face death in a bold and calm manner. Another essential 
                                                          
21 Kriti Sharma, Santhara: Jains’ Right to Exit with Dignity,available at  
http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/Santhara-jains-right-to-exit-with-dignity. (last 
visited Dec., 2015). 
22 Shah, supra note 1. 
23 Id. 
24 MARGARET PABST BATTIN, THE ETHICS OF SUICIDE: HISTORICAL SOURCES 47 
(U.S.A: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
25 Shiv Visvanathan, A Reductive Reading of Santhara, THEHINDU, available 
at http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/a-reductive-reading-of-
Santhara/article7572187.ece. (last visited Dec., 2015). 
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difference between the two acts is that certain means might be 
employed by a person committing suicide, that is, use of weapons 
to kill oneself, however no means are employed to bring about 
death in the practice of Santhara. In Jaina texts and scriptures, 
people who commit suicide are defined as “those who use 
weapons, throw themselves into the fire and water and are liable to 
be caught in the wheel of Samsara”.26 Fasting unto death, if based 
on force, is against the spirit of non-violence the basic tenet of 
Jainism. Jaina religion forbids all kinds of purposeless violence. 
Consequently, except fasting unto death, all other methods of 
voluntary chosen death are forbidden in Jainism.27  Further, unlike 
suicide there is nothing done in secrecy by a person taking the vow 
of Santhara. It is not a speedy procedure either. There are various 
pre-conditions that need to be fulfilled: the family members are 
consulted, permission is sought from the spiritual guru, and all the 
family members and relatives are informed about the vow of 
Santhara. It is a high spiritual achievement which is celebrated and 
no condolences are held for the departed soul. Therefore, it cannot 
be declared as an act of suicide in any manner. 
Further, the Rajasthan High court incorrectly referred to the case of 
Smt. Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab28 and held that right to life does not 
include the right to die. It simply stated that Santhara was an act of 
suicide and there was no dignity in such an act. No proper 
examination was done as to whether Santhara actually fits into or 
equates to suicide in any manner. The Gian Kaur29 case clearly 
stated that the right to life includes the right to live with human 
dignity. Such a right would exist up to the end of a natural life. 
Further, this also includes the right to a dignified life to the point of 
death and would also encompass a dignified procedure of death. It 
was clearly explained by the Supreme Court that a right to life may 
also include the right of a dying man to die with dignity when his 
life is ebbing out. 
                                                          
26 Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1996 SC 946. 
27 Shah, supra note 1. 
28 Smt. Gian Kaur, AIR 1996 SC 946. 
29 Id. 
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The Rajasthan High Court Judgment in Nikhil Soni v. Union of 
India30, wherein it decided there was no dignity in Santhara and it 
was a way of ending one‟s life unnaturally, is likely to have 
sweeping consequences, not only amongst the Jain community in 
Rajasthan but conjointly across the country. Unfortunately, it 
conflates many essential issues of constitutional law, and reflects 
the confusion over the basic guarantee of religious freedom in our 
constitutional jurisprudence. The Court not only denies the 
community constitutional protection, but additionally takes upon 
itself the task of re-characterising the religion in an exceedingly 
progressive light, and in a sense, produces new social facts through 
its holdings. 
IV. Conclusion 
The centuries-old ritual of Santhara has been under scrutiny since 
2006, when the case of 93-year-old Keila Devi Hirawat from Jaipur 
invited international debate on whether there was any place for 
such a ritual within modern times. Today, Santhara stands as a 
classic example of the challenge that every faith-based society faces 
due to pressures placed upon them to follow modern and secular 
norms. On one hand, there is a challenge to balance individual 
freedom and personal liberty as a minority community's spiritual 
rights, and on the other, the necessity for state intervention in 
matters of faith. Santhara is a spiritual practice of meeting the 
challenge of death and can by no reasonable construction be 
equated to suicide. As held by the Apex Court, a person‟s right to 
live with dignity also includes the right of a dying man to die with 
dignity. This practice forms an essential religious practice in 
Jainism as proved by Jain ascetics and religious denominations by 
appreciating the continuance of such practice since the very 
inception of the religion. The Nikhil Soni judgment not only affects a 
spiritual group‟s freedoms bonded within the Constitution, but 
also conjointly features continuing dialogue on the right to die with 
dignity. While the Supreme Court is yet to conclusively determine 
the matter, it is imperative that the court adopts a cautious 
                                                          
30 Nikhil Soni v. Union of India& Ors., WRW 274/2015. 
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approach in its choice and understanding of precedents, as the 
same are likely to be misconstrued. 
The Supreme Court should not only declare the practice as 
„essentially religious‟ and provide protection to the same under the 
Constitution but should also reconsider its present view on the 
„essential practices doctrine‟. It needs to revert to the original 
definition of the „essential practices doctrine‟ as was envisaged by 
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar in the Constituent Assembly Debates. The 
emphasis should be laid to differentiate between an essentially 
religious and a secular practice. The court‟s authority should not 
extend to taking the job of religious heads and determining as to 
what constitutes an essential practice within a religion. Such 
assumption of power by the Courts has already caused the 
weakening of the fundamentally inscribed religious freedom in 
India. Further, continuance of the doctrine with its present 
interpretation is definitely bound to have negative ramifications. 
Religion should be accepted as is being represented by its 
practitioners. What the judiciary needs to consider while bringing 
down any religious practice is whether such practice is hampering 
societal modifications, is causing any societal inequality or is 
violating any individual‟s rights. 
